Ḥaydar al-Harawī (d. 825/after 1427) was a significant scholar from Khorasan who migrated to the Ottoman lands. A distinguished student of al-Taftazanī, he earned high regard from Mehmed I and received patronage from him. al-Harawī dedicated his commentary on al-Zamakhsharī’s al-Kashshāf to Mehmed I with exaggerated expressions of praise and provided significant details about his biography in the introduction of the work. After spending many years in Ottoman lands, al-Harawī established contact with Shahrukh, the son of Timur. He rewrote the (...) introduction of Sharḥ al-Kashshāf and ded- icated the work to Shahrukh. This new patronage relationship is evident in the second version of the introduction, where not only the dedication part but also the content was rearranged concerning the new patron’s identity. Important biographical details not found in the first version are included in the second version, making it a crucial source for al-Harawī’s biography. This article brings the second version of the introduction to light for the first time, constructing al-Harawī’s biography by compiling information from both versions. While no specific dates are provided in either version, the duration of al-Harawi’s stay in certain cities is mentioned. Gaps in the narrative were filled based on histori- cal events, allowing for accurate dating of approximately forty years of al-Harawī’s life, from Sarakhs through Shiraz, Tabriz, Shirvan, Bursa, Edirne, and back to Khorasan. This comprehensive overview sheds light on the relationship between scholars and rulers, the influence of political developments on scholarly life, and the intellectual world of a scholar dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge. (shrink)

Ḥuqūq al-Islām.--Ḥuqūq al-vālidain.--Ādāb al-maʻ̄ashirat.--Ag̲h̲lāt̤ al-ʻulūm.

That brings me to the crux of my disagreement with Hillis Miller. The central contention is not simply that I am sometimes, or always, wrong in my interpretation, but instead that I—like other traditional historians—can never be right in my interpretation. For Miller assents to Nietzsche's challenge of "the concept of 'rightness' in interpretation," and to Nietzsche's assertion that "the same text authorizes innumerable interpretations : there is no 'correct' interpretation."1 Nietzsche's views of interpretation, as Miller says, are relevant to (...) the recent deconstructive theorists, including Jacques Derrida and himself, who have "reinterpreted Nietzsche" or have written "directly or indirectly under his aegis." He goes on to quote a number of statements from Nietzsche's The Will to Power to the effect, as Miller puts it, "that reading is never the objective identifying of a sense but the importation of meaning into a text which had no meaning 'in itself.'" For example: "Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported into them." "In fact interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something."2 On the face of it, such sweeping deconstructive claims might suggest those of Lewis Carroll's linguistic philosopher, who asserted that meaning is imported into a text by the interpreter's will to power: "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things.""The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all." But of course I don't believe that such deconstructive claims are, in Humpty Dumpty fashion, simply dogmatic assertions. Instead, they are conclusions which are derived from particular linguistic premises. I want, in the time remaining, to present what I make out to be the elected linguistic premises, first of Jacques Derrida, then of Hillis Miller, in the confidence that if I misinterpret these theories, my errors will soon be challenged and corrected. Let me eliminate suspense by saying at the beginning that I don't think that their radically skeptical conclusions from these premises are wrong. On the contrary, I believe that their conclusions are right—in fact, they are infallibly right, and that's where the trouble lies. · 1. "Tradition and Difference," Diacritics 2 : 8, 12.· 2. Ibid. M. H. Abrams’s contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History: A Reply to Wayne Booth" and "Behaviorism and Deconstruction: A Comment on Morse Peckham's 'The Infinitude of Pluralism'". (shrink)

Peckham claims that my "behavior" in dealing with the quotations in Natural Supernaturalism is the same, in methodology and validity, as the interpretative behavior of Booth's waiter. But the great bulk of the utterances in my quotations—and no less, of the utterances constituting Peckham's own essay—do not consist of orders, requests, or commands. Instead, they consist of assertions, descriptions, judgments, exclamations, approbations, condemnations, and many other kinds of speech-acts, the meanings of which are not related to my interpretative behavior, even (...) in the indirect way in which the meaning of Booth's order is related to the future behavior of his waiter. M. H. Abrams, author of Natural Supernaturalism and The Mirror and the Lamp and Class of 1916 Professor of English at Cornell University, responds in this essay to Morse Peckham's "The Infinitude of Pluralism" . Morse Peckham, in his Critical Response, was commenting on issues raised by the forum on "The Limits of Pluralism" , to which M. H. Abrams contributed. Previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History: A Reply to Wayne Booth" and "The Deconstructive Angel". (shrink)

In retrospect, I think I was right to compose Natural Supernaturalism by relying on taste, tact, and intuition rather than on a controlling method. A book of this kind, which deals with the history of human intellection, feeling, and imagination, employs special vocabularies, procedures, and modes of demonstration which, over many centuries of development, have shown their profitability when applied to matters of this sort. I agree with Booth that these procedures, when valid, are in a broad sense rational, and (...) subject to analysis and some degree of definition. But the rules underlying such a discourse are complex, elusive, unsystematic, and subject to innovative modification; they manifest themselves in the intuitive expertise of the historian; and the specification of these rules should not precede, but follow practice. . . . After the fact, nevertheless, a book like Natural Supernaturalism is subject to close critical inquiry about its methods and rationale. I am grateful to Booth for opening up such an inquiry, and for doing so in a way that is not only disarming, but seems to me to be the most promising of useful results. That is, instead of adopting a prosecutorial stance, demanding: "Justify the rationality and probative force of what you have done; it looks dammed suspicious to me," he has adopted the friendly tactic of saying: "Your book, in my experience of it, has yielded discoveries that I want to call knowledge, by methods, however deviant from standard rubrics of valid reasoning, that it seems irrational to call non-rational. Let's set out to clarify what these methods are, and to see what grounds we can find for the claim that they provide warranted knowledge." M.H. Abrams' contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Deconstructive Angel" and "Behaviorism and Deconstruction: A Comment on Morse Peckham's 'The Infinitude of Pluralism'". (shrink)

Juan B. Justo en la historia y el pensamiento argentinos, por A. Solari.--Teoría y práctica de la historia, por M. H. Alberti.--La base biológica de la historia, por F. Escardó.--La técnica, por A. Justo.--La economía, por R. Bogliolo.--La guerra, por A. G. Rodríguez.--La política, por A. Ghioldi.--La lucha de ciases, por R. Mondolfo.--El salariado, por M. Palacín.--Las formas típicas del privilegio, por J. L. Pena.--El gremialismo proletario, por E. Frugoni.--La cooperación libre, por N. Repetto.--La democracia obrera, por L. Pan.--La religión, (...) la cilencia, el arte, por R. Rivière. (shrink)

Although female and male gametes are presumably equivalent in their genetic contribution to embryos, they carry specific information, perhaps reversibly imprinted into the genomes during oogenesis and spermatogenesis, as to their maternal or paternal origin. This information is crucial for embryogenesis and, in the absence of at least one haploid set of chromosomes from each parent, embryos do not develop to term. The paternal genome is probably required for proliferation of extraembryonic tissues and the maternal genome for some stages of (...) embryogeneis. Furthermore, the effects of certain mutations are determined by the paternal or maternal origin of the inheritance. (shrink)

Le volume s'enquiert des liens entre l'affectivite et l'activite philosophique. Sur le mode historique et/ou problematique il s'agit de traiter de questions telles que: Y a-t-il une ou des tonalites affectives specifiques a la philosophie: etonnement, angoisse, ennui, serenite, melancolie,...? L'activite philosophique est-elle associee a un deni de l'affectivite et sous quelles formes: nihilisme, detachement, refoulement...? Quel rapport le philosophe noue-t-il a l'ambivalence de l'affect (indecidabilite, double bind,...)? Qu'en est-il de la reception thematique de l'affectivite en philosophie: une philosophie ou (...) une phenomenologie de l'affectivite est-elle possible? Quel statut philosophique pour des sciences nouvelles - les neurosciences -qui pretendent etudier objectivement et techniquement l'affectivit. (shrink)

Many African scholars have expressed varied thoughts about the concept of a person, specifically about that which constitutes a person in African philosophy. These philosophers include Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye and Segun Gbadegesin. What they have in common, though, is that their ideas on the concept of a person issue largely from the traditional philosophies of some West African peoples. Wiredu and Gyekye reflect on Akan conceptions while Gbadegesin carries out his discussions from the Yoruba cultural perspective. This paper examines (...) the thoughts of these prominent philosophers, with a particular focus on the constitution of the person and the nature of his or her destiny. (shrink)